A Provisional Phenomenology of the Audiobook by Wittkower, Dylan E.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy & Religious Studies
2011
A Provisional Phenomenology of the Audiobook
Dylan E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University, dwittkow@odu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy & Religious Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Wittkower, Dylan E., "A Provisional Phenomenology of the Audiobook" (2011). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 13.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/13
Original Publication Citation
Wittkower, D.E. (2011). A provisional phenomenology of the audiobook. In M. Rubery (Ed.), Audiobooks, literature, and sound
studies (Vol. 12, pp. 216-231): Routledge.
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
12 A Preliminary Phenomenology 
of the Audiobook
D. E. Wittkower
Philosophy has been called “a radical asking of the common questions of 
everyday.”1 Here, our object of inquiry is not one as fundamental to experi-
ence as those typical of philosophical inquiry, and our question not quite 
so common or everyday. Rather than radicalizing general questions such as 
“What is that?” “Who are you?” or “What time is it?” we will instead ask 
two interconnected questions:
  • What is it like to listen to an audiobook?
  • What are we listening to when we listen to an audiobook?
Before turning to the experience of listening to an audiobook, it is worth 
making a few preparatory notes on the material conditions necessary for 
the possibility of this experience. Wired or wireless, the audiobook can 
reach us only through our involvement in a larger technical system, both 
in the preparation of the experience in question and in the circumstances 
of the experience itself. The preparation necessary for the possibility of the 
experience, completed within a larger technical system, may differ in each 
instance, but a typical preparation might include obtaining an audiobook 
on CD or through download, adding the audio fi les to a digital library on 
a desktop computer, adding the fi les within a playlist synced to an MP3 
player, and updating the MP3 audio library. The circumstances necessary 
for the possibility of the experience itself will differ as well but invariably 
include integration in one of a number of larger technical systems, such as 
listening to the audiobook on a car stereo while driving, on a home stereo 
while performing domestic tasks, or on an MP3 player while walking or 
at the gym.
We must also note that the activity is neither isolated nor all-consuming: 
in fact, if we are to understand the experience of listening to an audiobook, 
we should not assume that the convergence of intermixed and simultaneous 
activities has no bearing on the phenomenology of listening, or that coinci-
dent activities would not have different effects on the experience. Thus, in a 
full phenomenology of the audiobook, we would have to consider listening 
Rubery 1st pages.indd   216 12/8/2010   8:56:08 AM
A Preliminary Phenomenology of the Audiobook  217
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
as an experience suffi ciently situated and specifi c to be attuned to the infl u-
ence of convergent activities but general enough to be able to provide a reso-
nant shared notion of a ‘what it’s like’ for audiobook listening.2 This most 
general understanding of the experience of audiobook listening exhibits 
many distinct although interrelated movements:
 1. The audiobook is a temporal object of experience;
 2. The audiobook is spoken;
 3. The audiobook has a speaker;
 4. The audiobook is started, stopped, and restarted;
 5. The audiobook forms a context of physical and social experience.
Owing to space limitations, I will concentrate in this chapter on the audio-
book as a temporal object of experience, as this is directly relevant to phe-
nomenological discussions of aural experiences originating with Edmund 
Husserl. The remaining movements will then be addressed more briefl y, 
and the reader welcomed to consider these commentaries as spurs, notes, 
or proposals for future research.
1. THE AUDIOBOOK IS A TEMPORAL 
OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE
The audiobook is audible and auditory. This will obviously distinguish it 
from the written work of which it is a performance, and the specifi c time-
boundedness of the auditory object must be addressed in order to make 
sense of what we are listening to when we listen to an audiobook. At the 
same time, while we will compare the audiobook to previously theorized 
auditory objects of experience, such as music or the speech of a present 
other, we must distinguish it from these other objects as well.
“All sensation takes place in time,” Walter Ong has noted, “but sound 
has a special relationship to time. . . . There is no way to stop sound and 
have sound. I can stop a moving picture camera and hold one frame fi xed 
on the screen. If I stop the movement of sound, I have nothing.”3 Even the 
fi lm, though, does not really exist as an object of experience within its still 
frames but is essentially in the movement and fl ow from one moment to the 
next. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, “[A] fi lm as a perceptual object . . . 
is not a sum total of images but a temporal gestalt,”4 and the perception of 
its “movement,” as with the perception of a melody rather than individual 
notes, is really the primary and fundamental content of our experience of 
these objects:
melody does not perceptibly change when transposed, that is, when all 
its notes are changed while their interrelationships and the structure of 
the whole remain the same. On the other hand, just one single change 
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in these interrelationships will be enough to modify the entire make-up 
of the melody. Such a perception of the whole is more natural and more 
primary than the perception of isolated elements.5
So too, as Don Ihde has put it, “[W]hen I listen to someone speak, I do not 
ordinarily hear a syllable at a time, or even a word, but I hear the larger 
melody and fl ow of speech as an ongoing rhythmic unity.”6 The auditory 
speech-object is the process of movement between sounds and phonemes. 
Hence a fuller discussion of how we hear a melody rather than individual 
notes will allow us to give a “close listening” to the experience of hearing a 
sentence rather than tones, consonants, and phonemes.
How We Hear a Melody
Each particular sound—say, the note of middle C—is physically present 
only while it is being actively created by the vibration of the instrument or 
speaker system. As we experience the C followed by an F, and then a G, a C 
major tonality is established in the melody. Should the G be followed by a B, 
we would experience the B as leaning upward toward a return to the tonic, 
while, had we simply heard a B in isolation, we would experience no such 
tension. Furthermore, in order to have an experience of the B as a leading 
tone, we must not merely remember the preceding tones but must continue 
to feel them as well—but we must feel them as present under erasure for, as 
John Brough points out, “a melody, whose successive notes were heard all at 
once as now, would not appear as a melody at all, but as a crash of simulta-
neous sound.”7 No longer foreground but not yet absent to perception, the 
notes that are no longer physically present to the eardrum must be phenom-
enally present to the listener in order to form the background against which 
the primary impression of the sounding note appears. It is only this presence-
undererasure of the absent which makes it possible to hear a melody rather 
than a series of mere tones or a clashing cacaphonic muddle.
Husserl describes this as retention—sharply distinguished from mem-
ory. Retention is a kind of primary remembrance in which we maintain 
what just was as a continuing presence to experience, which relativizes the 
ongoing primary perception of the senses. Memory as we usually use the 
term is not the presence of a still-perceived ‘just-having-been,’ but rather 
a prior ‘now’ which appears to us only through our recall of it—in Hus-
serl’s words, “not perceived, i.e. self-given, but presentifi ed.”8 Perception 
of objects—such as the melody—which appear in several parts, only one of 
which is primally present at any moment, requires retention, not memory. 
Merleau-Ponty makes the same point in a different way:
If the past were available to us only in the form of express recollec-
tions, we should be continually tempted to recall it in order to verify 
its existence . . . whereas in fact we feel it behind us as an incontest-
able acquisition.9
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The presence of a perceived object of experience includes, in addition to a 
‘now’ and a ‘just-having-been,’ a primordial unity with a future as a ‘just-
about-to-be.’ In the prior example, the experience of the B as a leading tone 
requires not only a felt carrying-along of the ‘just-having-been’ but also 
a projective hearing in which the C that is not heard is experienced in its 
absence within our hearing of the B. The presence to experience of the B as 
a tone pushing us toward a return to the home tone of C is constructed by 
the presence of the having-just-been but consists of the presence to experi-
ence of the just-about-to-be: the C which is not heard, or which is ‘heard’ 
as not-yet-present. In harmonies this is felt even more clearly: the move-
ment I–IV–V–VI7 is experienced as a false resolution precisely because the 
VI7 chord is heard as superimposed against the tonic chord established by 
the dominant chord as an expectation. The VI7 chord sounds false to the 
ear not upon refl ection or as an intellectual judgment, but rather it is felt 
as false from the moment the tones sound because it is heard as failing to 
match up with the tonic chord present to experience at that moment as the 
anticipated resolution that we are precisely not listening to. This presence 
in the ‘now’ of an expected future is discussed by Husserl as protention and 
is the futural equivalent of retention, as Thomas Clifton has explained:
Protention is the term for a future which we anticipate, and not merely 
await. Awaiting, like recollection, implies a disengagement from the 
present, whereas, experientially, the now which we perceive is colored 
by the way we intend the future. Intending a future with respect to a 
given event means to attach signifi cance to that event in proportion 
to the way the present and future are attached to, yet distinguishable 
from, each other.10
In listening to speech, too, we certainly do not merely await to hear what 
words will “arrive” next but instead actively intend the future in modifi ed 
ways from one phoneme to the next. This is clearly the case when listening 
to the speech of a present other, as the future is projected forth by context, 
relationship, body language, and so forth, but this structure of active antici-
pation and construction of meaning is also present in a full and vibrant way 
while listening to recorded speech. As we will see, when we listen to the 
audiobook, we hear every word as along with the words that have been and 
as against the words that could have been, just as surely as, in the melody, 
we hear each note with the notes which preceded it and against the notes 
which might have followed.
How We Hear a Sentence
Processes of retention and protention are necessary for the listener’s com-
prehension of the spoken word: each new phoneme is heard as relativized 
by the phonemes preceding it and construct for us a protended anticipa-
tion of the words likely to follow. The adjective alerts the listener to a 
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substantive to follow; the pronoun projects forward a verb. The listener 
actively constructs the meaning of sentences as the phonemes are sounded 
and replace one another through time: in order for the subject to be heard 
as the subject, the listener must hear it along with the not-yet-presence of 
the predicate which it, as subject, implies will follow. The predicate only 
appears to the listener as a predicate insofar as the listener retains the sub-
ject of the sentence as the just-having-been, which is the background upon 
which the predicate appears; the predication of the predicate inheres in the 
absent presence of the retained subject.
All of this is true of the written word as well but in differing ways. The 
written word is put into motion, so to speak, by the action of the reader. 
The reader moves forward across the page, replacing the phonemes present 
within the ‘now’ of the inner voice at her own pace, circling back to reread 
as necessary. The spoken word, when containing clauses and conditionals, 
must be heard by the listener as a series of related points, each of which 
must be retained by her and actively reconstructed as the succession of pho-
nemes continue to bring further meaning to earlier components. Consider 
this sentence as it would have to be understood if spoken:
Consider (imperative action, protends an object) this (protention pro-
longed: what is it?) sentence (protended object supplied; imperative 
must be retained in order to contextualize the intended encounter of 
this object) as (modifi es retained imperative action “consider”) it (pro-
noun calling for retention of substantive “this sentence”) would (clari-
fi es retained modifi cation “as” of retained imperative “consider”—the 
listener now knows we are going to consider the sentence “as” some-
thing in some counterfactual form yet to be determined) have (the 
listener hears /æ/ rather than / /, signaling that this “have” does not 
primarily modify the “would”—as in the spoken “would’ve,” which 
uses a schwa—but will instead modify something which is to follow. If 
the speaker is American, this word will be pronounced /hæf/, indicat-
ing that this “have” is not the “have” of possession, which is /hæv/ in 
both UK and US English, but will instead form the idiomatic “have 
to” of necessitation) to (with retained “have” forms idiom of necessita-
tion, protending a subject to be necessitated yet to be determined) be 
(infi nitive verb fragment, the listener must still wait for more context) 
understood (that which is necessitated by the “have to” is supplied, and 
the retained phrases “have to” and “to be” can now be used to connect 
supplied content “understood” with object “sentence” under imperative 
“consider”) if (indicates that the specifi c nature of counterfactualism, 
implied previously by “would,” will now be supplied) spoken (retained 
sentence now placed under counterfactual conditional supplied).
Protention and retention are both different from conscious or intentional 
recall and expectation, and this breakdown of the process of listening is not 
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meant to represent the self-aware movements of the mind but instead meant 
to clarify and make present to awareness the unnoticed and unrefl ective 
process of structured listening and active contextualization which makes 
understanding possible. This structured listening constructs a number of 
simultaneous timelines. The subject is given, protending a predicate. But 
then, a modifying clause is given to the subject, and we must maintain 
our protention of predication while modifying the retained subject. Having 
circled back, we may again move forward in the construction of meaning. 
As each word replaces the last in the succession of ‘nows,’ we construct 
the meaning of the sentence through a nonlinear cycle of emerging proten-
tions which are variously resolved into the retained content, and the overall 
meaning of the sentence emerges out of the circling back of elements upon 
one another, as we might see water as fl owing downstream even though it 
does so through a complex and meandering process of moving up, down, 
and backward through ripples and eddies on the surface.
2. THE AUDIOBOOK IS SPOKEN
In the written word, the particular modes of relevance of one word upon 
another are not communicated through grammatical roles alone but also 
take place through the occult actions of punctuation marks. In the spoken 
word, similar signals are given through precisely timed pauses and changes 
in tone. The commas used to offset modifying or explanatory clauses, such 
as those surrounding this aside, are intended to be heard differently, and to 
construct meaning differently, than those within a list. The colon indicates 
content: that which follows it loops back upon and superimposes on that 
which precedes it. The modifying or explanatory clause—set off by com-
mas or em dashes, like this—is lowered in pitch relative to the primary 
“timeline” of the sentence. Some words are emphasized in volume or enun-
ciation in order to signal to the listener that these words are essential to the 
retrospective reconstruction of the meaning of the sentence in question. 
Words in subordinate clauses and noun phrases are run together subtly in 
order to indicate their unifi cation as objects distinct from other “moving 
parts” within the overall claim. Parentheticals are uttered sotto voce (at 
half voice, like this).
Punctuation marks may seem far clearer than the pauses and vocal 
modulations of the spoken word, but it is not obvious that they have speci-
fi able meaning. It seems just as likely that they notify us simply that some-
thing is supposed to happen at a given point in the sentence, and—like 
“reading” vowels in Hebrew—the reader is depended on to be able to tell 
based on context what is supposed to be happening. Today’s punctuation 
usages are formalized and do not always track the rhythms which lend 
speech its intelligibility. Turning back to earlier forms of written English, 
we can see punctuation which is less a formal feature of writing and more 
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an encoding of speech. For example, consider a passage from John Stuart 
Mill’s Utilitarianism:
Against this doctrine [the Greatest Happiness Principle], however, 
arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, 
cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in 
the fi rst place, it is unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what 
right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by 
the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be?11
Whereas this passage closely tracks the affordances of speech in aiding the 
listener’s active construction of meaning, it is still clearly composed and far 
different from speech as extemporaneously spoken.
~To speak with someone, that is, to speak with a particular, well to 
speak in the way that we really do talk most of the time, requires that 
there’s a lot of back and forth and often (well, I do this—you probably do 
too), if you really pay attention to what someone says, we’ll start a sentence 
three or four times before fi nishing it. And then start back up in the middle 
again! And when the speaker moves on from one point to another without 
fi nishing the fi rst thought, maybe we know where she was going, or, if 
we don’t, we forget about it because we’re concerned with communicating 
with the person in front of us! The words are just a means to that end, and 
if there are a few loose ends at the end, who cares! (—and plus, there’s no 
evidence, right?) Spoken words move their cargo like ants pulling along a 
bit of bread: the ants fall down, some drop it, others keep going, some peel 
off to go do something else, and some of them push it the wrong way, and 
little by little, the bread moves on down the line.~
The written word is fully available to the reader,12 to be engaged with at 
her own pace and in the order and level of care that she prefers. The spatial 
presentation of writing allows for a nonlinear visual encounter because 
space, unlike the successive presentation of time, contains and co-presents 
its elements. The reader may circle back, repeat, review. And so, in contrast 
to the way spoken word functions between present conversationalists, a 
written thought must be completed and consistent before it is expressed.
In between the starting and stopping of playback, the audiobook follows 
its own rhythm and pace in a context-insensitive and user-independent way. 
Listening to an audiobook is not like listening to a person speak—persons 
speaking to persons make eye contact, pause to invite signs that the listener 
is paying attention, use body language to emphasize or change meanings, 
and um and hem and haw. The audiobook proceeds at the same inexorable 
rate while the audience drifts in and out of attention.
(Please read this paragraph backward from the end.) .paragraph this in 
simulate to tried have I which experience this is It .something missed we’ve 
fi nd we if sentence the of beginning the to back look simply cannot we 
because ,end the at together all it piece to passed just has what of enough 
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remember to working actively ,procession their on carry words the while 
on going is what out work to attempt must We .sound of nature momentary 
the of diffi culty inherent the exacerbates understanding and meaning create 
to take-and-give interpersonal the use to inability This .needed when back 
circle and listener the to respond to ability the without ,relentlessly forward 
continues narrator The .language written or spoken either of affordances 
the of many lacks audiobook The
The audiobook, as an audio performance of the written word, contains 
the determinate and preconsidered meaningfulness of the written word but 
without the affordance of nonlinear options for reader engagement. How-
ever, the richness of human speech seems to be suffi cient compensation to 
support comprehension, even without the give-and-take of listening to a 
present other. Not only are the guiding rhythms of speech reintroduced, 
substituting for punctuation marks—their pale written equivalent—but 
additionally every word is made replete with meaning through its intona-
tion. As Ihde has observed,
For the reader who comes upon the word on a page, the fi eld and its 
unsaid signifi cance is a dark obscurity. . . . But if this word is spoken, 
there is already a certain potential fi eld and presence of unsaid signifi -
cance in the voice. If “Adam” is said in an angry voice, imploringly, or 
in a quiet whisper, each sounded presence allows the “bare word” to 
emerge from some of its obscurity in the sounding of its presence.13
Similar to Heidegger’s observation that Dasein always fi nds itself having 
a mood (Stimmung), we may observe that the voice always has some kind 
of attunement. Just as “the pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood . . . is far 
from nothing at all,” so too is the word spoken with no infl ection and a fl at 
affect just as full of meaning in its performance as if spoken animatedly.14 
The voice cannot but carry with it an emotional component, even when 
that component is emotionlessness. Marshall McLuhan noted that “[t]here 
are not many ways of writing ‘tonight,’ but Stanislavsky used to ask his 
young actors to pronounce and stress it fi fty different ways. . . . The writ-
ten word spells out in sequence what is quick and implicit in the spoken 
word.”15 The audiobook, although it contains this narrative description of 
what is emotively present in the spoken word, contains the replete modula-
tions of the spoken word as well.
The pause, too, plays a great role in aiding the construction of mean-
ing. The pause can function as a grammatical marker, signaling when to 
bind together meanings with preceding substantives, or when to expect 
further conditionals, modifi ers, actions, and so forth. Pauses serve not only 
as signals to engage in these forms of synthesis and expectation but also 
as opportunities to do so. When the narrator moves along too quickly, or 
without suitably lengthy pauses at constitutive interstices, we very easily 
become confused and fall behind. The longer pauses which come at the end 
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of sentences, paragraphs, or sections serve a similar role, except that they 
signal the completion of a larger process of construction and provide the 
opportunity for the listener to bind together a larger set of meanings. As 
Husserl points out, these fi nial pauses are not experienced as silence:
One speaks of the dying or fading away etc., of the content of sensation 
when veritable perception passes over into retention. Now, according 
to the statements made hitherto, it is already clear that the retentional 
“content” is, in the primordial sense, no content at all. . . . The re-
tentional sound is not actually present but “primarily remembered” 
precisely in the now.16
Consider the natural pause which occurs at the end of a classical perfor-
mance. It is surely possible for an audience member to applaud too soon, 
but this rarely occurs. Instead, the audience members seem on the whole to 
have an agreement about when the pause necessary to the piece has elapsed, 
or they simply await the downward return of the conductor’s baton. The 
duration of this pause is rightly regarded as a part of the composition, for 
applause too early is heard as an interruption despite the fact that sound 
is no longer being produced. Without this pause, the music stops but does 
not end; the binding together of sound into unitary temporal experience 
requires this pause, and thus there can only be an ending in the sense of 
coming to fruition when there is an appropriately timed pause which, as 
the ending of the piece, is as integral to the experience as any note sounded 
within it.17 The appropriate duration is dictated by the mental reverberation 
required by binding the experience, not by a physical echo which may be 
present. It is likely that a haunting piece which trails off into a lonely and 
hopeless pianissimo would require a longer pause before applause than a 
louder piece with less emotional depth, even if the latter is performed in a 
very live room and the former in a more muted space. Unlike the physical 
reverberations of the echo, the mental reverberation of retentional mean-
ing-binding in the pause grows louder as the pause extends. Or, at least, up 
to a certain point—certainly the pause can be too long, at which point the 
listener has fi nished attending to what has just been heard and has become 
distracted by other events, or the silence ceases to retain what came before 
and begins to protend what is about to occur. In the concert hall, we await 
the drop of the conductor’s baton, and at some point we are no longer still 
‘listening’ to the now-absent music but begin instead to think, “What’s 
going on? Should I clap? Maybe it isn’t over yet . . .”
In order to properly bring sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to frui-
tion, the narrator of an audiobook must similarly pause for the right 
amount of time and do so for the same reasons. Should the pause be too 
short, comprehension is inhibited and the listener becomes confused or dis-
engaged. Like the conductor holding her hand aloft, the narrator can signal 
to the audience not to move on, not to be distracted, and not to stop paying 
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attention. For this reason, it may be that audiobooks have special value 
to offer to poetry, for readers may have diffi culty lingering properly over 
phrases, and the audiobook forces an appropriate refl ective duration (even 
if the refl ection itself does not always take place). As Nick Piombino put 
it, “[T]he aural ellipses of the contemporary poem ensure that there will 
be spaces for invention on the part of the listener. . . . this is all the more 
important in contemporary life where there is so much talking and so little 
listening.”18 When we read the written poem, we are ‘talking’ and ‘listen-
ing’ to our ‘inner voice,’ and unless we make a serious effort to internally 
perform the poem, it is very easy to fail to hear the poem at all. Having the 
poetic work performed provides a structure to support the listener’s active 
listening: she must wait, and she may then be more likely to wonder and 
protend and refl ect. This effect extends to poetic and dramatic passages in 
prose works as well.
Surely, here too the pause can be too long. We are trained by radio to be 
bewildered by “dead air” in a way that we are not in the concert hall, and 
when there is any somewhat long pause, we begin to be distracted by our 
surroundings or to ask whether the track has ended, whether something has 
gone wrong with the playback, or whether it’s time to insert the next CD.
Here, the amount which can be carefully and precisely covered within a 
single book chapter is at an end. In order to make some attempt at appro-
priately broad coverage of the chapter’s topic, as previously mentioned, I 
will make some briefer and more informal commentaries on other aspects 
of a phenomenology of audiobooks.
Thus far, we have seen how listening to an audiobook requires a listen-
ing which binds together past, present, and future in an active construction 
of meaning. This process, while immensely complicated, is one to which we 
are well accustomed from its similarity to communication with a present 
other. We have also seen how pauses and intonations strongly aid com-
prehension of complex written prose, not necessarily intended to be read 
aloud, even when the affordances of the written page are removed.
Taken together, we might expect these aspects of audiobook listening to 
result in a displacing or entrancing experience. There is much work to do 
and attention demanded, and there is a fl ow of future with past into present 
which follows no rhythm but its own—and all of this is superimposed onto 
a visual fi eld and embodied interactions related to the auditory world of the 
audiobook in only the most accidental and arbitrary way. This overall depic-
tion of audiobook listening is already implied by what we have discussed to 
this point in the chapter, but the following will lend it further support.
3. THE AUDIOBOOK HAS A SPEAKER
The audiobook is a performance, and both the performance and the per-
former contribute much to the listening experience. But what exactly is part 
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of the experience is not as clear as it might seem and depends on the listener 
as well as the performer. As Ihde has noted,
in a highly concentrated “narrow” focus I get certain sounds in the 
other’s speech but may fi nd it almost impossible to note what was said; 
and contrarily in a “broader” focus, as in attending to what is being 
said, I may miss or barely be aware of the aspirated s which is charac-
teristic of the other’s speaking style.19
Professional audiobook narrators are selected for their ability to perform 
with either a neutral or content-appropriate accent, in which the goal, 
presumably, is to minimize the likelihood that the listener’s focus will be 
drawn by these formal aspects of the performance rather than by the con-
tent which it is meant to represent. Authors who narrate their own works 
seem to be coached in the expected style.
The free recordings available online at LibriVox give us an opportu-
nity to see whether and to what extent such formal variances infl uence our 
listening; LibriVox audiobooks are recorded by volunteers, and anybody 
with any kind of voice or accent may choose to record any public-domain 
work.20 Although other listeners disagree, I have personally never found it 
distracting to hear P. G. Wodehouse performed with an American accent 
and see no reason why the Southern American accent should be limited to 
Southern genre pieces rather than, for example, a history of England or the 
Christian Bible.21 Listening to Kirsten Ferreri’s recording of sections from 
The Antichrist on LibriVox was strange to me at fi rst, but, in less than a 
minute, I noticed that I was no longer listening to a woman reading Nietz-
sche but was instead listening simply to Nietzsche. Alternately, listening 
to Gesine’s recording of Schopenhauer’s Über die Weiber did not produce 
the same transparency—that a woman had chosen to voice Schopenhauer’s 
most misogynist essay reminds the listener of the performer’s presence as a 
mute agent behind the voice, and the performer’s active personal silence in 
the verbatim production of words which she must clearly disavow makes the 
materiality of her voice productively obstructive rather than transparent.
Some narrators purposefully add distinctive vocal characteristics as 
an attempt to highlight and enhance content—”doing voices,” as for 
example with Jim Dale’s award-winning narration of J. K. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter books. In some cases the “voices” are simply a binding 
together and representation of the content already within the written 
word; in other cases the “voices” are more a creative superaddition sup-
plying new content.
Altogether, the voice itself may be present in three primary ways: coun-
terpunctual, consonant, and dissonant. It may be present as a represen-
tation and enhancement of content, much as a counterpoint supports a 
melody while creating new content in accordance with its form. It may be 
present although transparent, fading into the background of the listener’s 
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experience, allowing the listener to focus simply on the content, much as 
consonant notes accompany and harmonize with a melody, simply draw-
ing out what is already in it. Or, it may be present in an obstructive form, 
whether in a purposeful and productive form, as in the example above of 
Gesine’s Schopenhauer, or in an accidental and purely disruptive form, as 
might be the case with a title that has poor recording quality or a vocal 
characteristic which the listener is for some reason unable to allow to fade 
into the background. In either case, the voice is similar to dissonant notes 
which clash against and sour a melody—interesting and deepening the 
experience when this is the intended effect but less so when unintended or 
poorly done.
These three modes of interaction between form and content—counter-
punctual, consonant, and dissonant—apply to physical and social contexts 
of listening as well. Listening to poetry on one’s iPod may be given a strong 
counterpoint by walking through woods; may be simply consonant with 
driving, allowing the experience of the road to fade away into the back-
ground; and may be dissonant with the commuter crowd, either in a surreal 
and interesting manner or in a manner simply annoying and distracting.
4. THE AUDIOBOOK IS STARTED, 
STOPPED, AND RESTARTED
The listener must initiate the process of playback when listening to an 
audiobook, at which time the vocal performance follows its own predeter-
mined schedule. The driver or the walker must plan ahead for the intended 
overlapping of experiences not only through the presence of audio fi les, 
with an appropriately integrated technological system of converting these 
fi les to sound waves, but also through the initiation of playback prior to the 
intended experiential convergence. The listener may experience frustration 
in starting playback in medias res, fumbling through CDs at a red light or 
trying to navigate MP3 directories while keeping pace.
If the driver does not specifi cally start and stop audiobooks but simply 
uses the powering on and off of the stereo as a stop and start button, the 
activity of driving is fully enclosed within playback: playback resumes 
upon starting the engine, and the driver must fi rst attune to the audio-
book, then turn to the road, and, once the driving process is complete, 
the playback continues until it too is halted. The walker, too, has experi-
ences akin to these “driveway moments,” in which the walker may con-
tinue on the exercise machine past the end of a planned amount of time 
or distance, waiting for an opportune and hard-to-anticipate moment of 
narrative resolution.
In the great majority of cases, the duration of playback is far longer than 
the duration of activities engaged in along with playback. The audiobook 
might reside in the driver’s car or the walker’s MP3 player for several weeks 
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and be played back over many commutes or exercise sessions. For this rea-
son, along with those in the preceding paragraphs, it is appropriate to say 
that listening forms the context in which the driving and walking occur 
rather than the other way around. In Merleau-Ponty’s visual terminology, 
the listening is the fi gure, and the driving or walking is the background. 
This conclusion may sound strange: we more often speak of listening to an 
audiobook while driving than of driving while listening to an audiobook. 
Still, this inversion is well supported by other common experiences: for 
example, that audiobooks may be most often listened to while on daily 
commutes or long road trips, situations in which little attention to the road 
is needed. It seems, further, that the very purpose of many who listen to 
audiobooks while at the gym—I suspect nearly everyone who does so—is 
precisely to move the process of exercise into the background in order to 
undergo it without so distinctly experiencing it. And thus the audiobook 
forms a context for physical and social experience rather than being expe-
rienced within a physical and social context.
Michael Bull has made observations in support of this point:
Listening frees up the eyes to observe and imagine, thus differing from 
the traditional reading of a book, in which the reader is visually engaged 
in the text. . . . The text becomes a continuous fl ow of sound on to which 
he adds a level of physicality in the act of imagination. The sound print 
of the book is imposed on the silence of the world around him.22
In the case considered here, the audiobook listener looks around a café, 
imagining that the people present are characters in the text. Clearly, there 
are many other ways that listening to an audiobook will condition physical 
and social experiences, depending upon the kind of listening involved and 
the kind of environment in which that listening takes place.
Ihde has discussed the orienting role of the background rhythms of 
nature and of the technosphere—the bird calls which signal the time of 
day, the hum of fl uorescent bulbs which provide a context for paperwork.23 
When I plug my ears, I remove this context and its cues, and I replace them 
with auditory events occurring in a different environment and a different 
space. It may be that I am to some subconscious extent aware of the con-
tours of that absent space to which I am listening in some dim shadow of 
the resonances made clear by composer Alvin Lucier’s classic I Am Sitting 
in a Room—at least, I am aware that it is a space different from the one 
in which I am embodied and navigate, for it does not change its direction 
when I turn my head, nor does it fade as a I walk, or change its resonance 
as I move from one room to another or go outside. In both time and space, 
the audiobook offers us an alternate and independent world that is liter-
ally experienced, without even considering the more metaphorical ‘other-
worldly’ effects of narrative and imagination.
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5. THE AUDIOBOOK FORMS A CONTEXT OF 
PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE
Some time ago, I walked through the grounds of the Bergianska trädgården 
in Stockholm while listening to a recording of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
essay “Self-Reliance.” Was one part of this experience supposed to enhance 
the other? Why is this “romantic” to say so? My memory of listening to 
Peter Kropotkin’s Conquest of Bread associated with the woods around 
a particular stretch of Interstate 77 is no less distinct, nor is my memory 
of listening to William Sangster’s Umbrellas and Their History while in a 
grocery store parking lot. Surely these moments cannot stand out in my 
mind due to any substantive connection between the physical experience 
and content of the audio context in which that experience occurred.
Less memorable is my experience of listening to David Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding while on the elliptical and the exer-
cise cycle, not because there was less of a connection, or less of interest to 
remember from the book, but instead due to an excess of familiarity. I have 
met both Hume’s text and the elliptical in different circumstances, and I can 
easily think of Hume without the gym coming to mind—but when I return 
to Emerson, the Bergianska trädgården comes along with it, as I have (as 
Hume would have put it) made them contiguous in my experience without 
diluting that contiguity through a multiplicity of other unrelated associa-
tions. “Custom,” as Hume said, “is the great guide of human life.”24
Certainly, as Bull has noted, audiobook listening changes the way we 
perceive our social environment.25 To his example of the listener sitting 
in the café, we might add the listener who watches the bustle of crowds 
and the listener among the bustle of a crowd; the listener seated on public 
transit; the listener in the corner store or supermarket. As noted above, 
these experiences may be counterpunctual, consonant, or dissonant with 
the audiobook which provides their context. The difference, it seems to me, 
may depend on the interpretation of the text in which the listener engages 
as much as anything else. It is not just one thing to listen to Jane Austen on 
the subway.
Regardless of how the social environment is experienced by the listener, 
it is clear that the listener is in some kind of disconnection with the social 
environment, experiencing it within a context not available to others in 
that environment. If the context for being-with-others is supplied via ear-
buds, whatever experience of community the listener has must be a kind of 
false or imaginary community—a public space interpreted as a private and 
interior event. And yet the listener is also part of a real but nonlocal com-
munity, at minimum a community formed by the work itself: the author, 
the performer, the listener, and all the other unknown listeners. This com-
munity may be indefi nite, where the listener might imagine how others 
reacted to, for example, a controversial event within a plot or claim within 
a nonfi ction work. This community may be well defi ned, as when a listener 
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has picked up an audiobook on the basis of its bestseller status, was lent it 
by friends or family, or was recommended it by Oprah Winfrey.
And so here we see three kinds of community within the seemingly 
solitary and solitude-seeking act of listening to an audiobook in public: a 
real but nonlocal community which is formed around the aesthetic work; 
a local but imaginary community within the listener’s privately contextual-
ized experience of others; and a real and local but unexperienced commu-
nity of audially unavailable mere presence-with others.
There are many further questions which a full phenomenology would 
address—in the preceding discussion I hope to have provided a solid start 
to such a phenomenology, along with a sketch of its contours. We have seen 
that the experience of an audiobook requires active binding of past, pres-
ent, and future; requires us to construct a timeline separate from that of our 
physical interactive world; is constructed and bears authoritative expres-
sions akin to written text; is personal and bears emotional attunement akin 
to spoken word; contains demanding and challenging silences; is borne by 
a voice which is counterpunctual, consonant, or dissonant; forms a context 
for physical and social experience; can be used to fade embodied experience 
into background; binds memory in ways very different from written text, 
due to the simultaneous experience of an arbitrarily related visual fi eld; and 
produces unusual forms of isolation-in-community.
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